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The Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Employees: 
Wealth Transfer, Gain-Sharing or Pain-Sharing?
Abstract
This paper considers whether gains made by shareholders from corporate takeovers are 
achieved at the expense of employees, as proposed by the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective. It 
analyses the contribution of employee lay-offs, along with employment and wage changes, 
to the takeover premium and abnormal share price movements. The analysis draws on a 
unique dataset of British takeovers, combining documentary, share price and accounting 
data. The results show that lay-offs planned at the takeover have either no effect or 
adverse effects on shareholder returns. Wages growth is positively, not inversely, related 
to shareholder returns from the second year after the takeover, whilst positive 
employment changes have a similar effect in the following year. Closer scrutiny indicates 
that labour and shareholders share gains when the firm does well, but share pain when it 
does not. There is evidence, therefore, that labour and shareholder interests can be 
complementary, rather than antagonistic, after takeovers.
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A long-standing claim in some quarters is that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) benefit 
shareholders at the expense of workers. The ‘breach of trust’ or ‘wealth transfer’ perspective, 
advanced by Shleifer and Summers (1988), proposes that corporate ownership transactions 
enable shareholders to renege on implicit contracts between managers and employees, thereby 
facilitating transfer of wealth from employees to shareholders. Its theoretical under-pinning is 
the view in transaction cost economics that employment contracts are inevitably incomplete, 
and that mutual understandings are required between the contracting parties to secure efficient 
outcomes. Takeovers threaten these understandings and enable shareholders to capture wealth 
from employees. Agency theory also highlights the role of takeovers in enabling shareholders 
to reduce agency costs by enhancing monitoring of company managers (Maksimovic et al., 
2011).
The context to the ‘breach of trust’ perspective was large-scale hostile takeover activity 
(the leveraged buy-out boom) during which corporate ‘raiders’ aimed to deliver substantial 
returns to shareholders by dismembering, restructuring and downsizing acquired firms. 
Although this wave of takeovers has passed, it continues to be widely believed, especially 
amongst trade unions and left-wing politicians, that shareholders benefit at labour’s expense 
during and after corporate takeovers. Employee lay-offs in the immediate aftermath of public 
takeovers, as in Kraft’s controversial takeover of Cadbury in 2012, do little to allay this belief 
(Mayer, 2013). In this instance, Kraft closed a factory with the loss of 400 jobs despite a pre-
takeover undertaking not to do so. Further jobs were shed in other locations shortly after the 
takeover.
Research on the impact of M&A events on employees is long-standing (Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1990; Khan et al., 2017; Brueller et al., 2018), with evidence of reductions in labour 































































demand and employment after such transactions (Conyon et al., 2002; Amess et al., 2014; 
Dessaint et al., 2017). What is less clear is whether the losses suffered by labour benefit 
shareholders, such that a ‘wealth transfer’ can be said to have occurred, especially as the 
overwhelming evidence is that shareholders of acquiring firms do not benefit from takeovers 
(Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004). There is of course substantial evidence, often derived 
from in-depth case studies, that takeovers can have harmful, indeed terminal, effects for 
companies, because breach of implicit contracts weakens employee trust (Buono and 
Bowditch, 1989; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) and dissipates valuable human capital (Zollo 
and Meier, 2008; Cording et al., 2014). It is less clear, however, whether adverse impacts on 
labour, such as lay-offs and employment reductions, are systematically related to shareholder 
gains or losses. One study so far has directly evaluated the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective, finding 
no relationship between job cuts and bid-premia, and that labour and shareholders experience 
‘equal misery’ after takeovers (Beckmann and Forbes, 2004). This study drew on a small 
sample and utilised data from some time ago (late 1980s/early 1990s).
Our paper presents new evidence on this issue by empirically analysing whether 
planned lay-offs, actual lay-offs, employment and wage changes post-merger are associated 
with shareholders’ returns, either in the short-term, as measured by the acquisition premium 
and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), or the longer term, as measured by Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHAR). Since takeovers can destroy shareholder value, we consider 
whether the relationships with labour changes vary according to whether shareholder gains are 
positive or negative. The data source is a unique dataset of takeovers across a range of 
industries in the British listed sector occurring over a twenty-one year period, in which 
documentary, stock market and accounting data for five financial years (one year before and 
three years after the takeover completion year) are matched with non-merging control firms.































































The results are not supportive of the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective. Takeover-related 
lay-off announcements are not significantly associated with the takeover premium and CAR 
secured by target shareholders. In contrast, such lay-off announcements have a negative, rather 
than positive, relationship with acquirer shareholders’ short-run gains. Post-takeover lay-offs 
also have insignificant relationships with BHAR. Employment and wage changes are either not 
related, or positively (not inversely) related with BHAR. Segmentation of the sample according 
to whether BHAR are positive or negative finds that, for the most part, labour and shareholders 
are ‘pain-sharing’ rather than ‘gain-sharing’. Employment reductions are associated with 
negative BHAR, but wages growth is associated with positive BHAR. 
Our results, therefore, question the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective on takeovers. More 
generally, they provide a critique of those perspectives that view ‘shareholder value’ as being 
achieved at labour’s expense (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Instead, our findings suggest 
that labour and shareholders’ interests can be complementary rather than antagonistic after 
takeovers. They are consistent with theoretical perspectives emphasising the importance of 
human capital resources for organisational performance, such as the resource-based view of 
the firm (Barney, 1991). A particular contribution of the paper is that it shows that the 
complementarity of interests functions when the firm is doing well or badly, but that there is 
an asymmetry of wages and employment in this respect. Employment reductions are associated 
with shareholders receiving negative abnormal returns, whilst wages growth is found when 
there are positive returns. This finding is consistent with long-standing views on ‘wage 
stickiness’ (i.e. that employment rather than wages tends to adjust downwards in response to 
adverse economic circumstances) (Blinder and Choi, 1990), whilst insiders tend to capture the 
benefits when times are good (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989).  































































The paper proceeds by reviewing the relevant literature and developing hypotheses.  
The data source and key variables are then outlined before results are presented.  
Takeovers and labour: background
Shleifer and Summers (1988) advanced the ‘breach of trust’ perspective to explain what 
happens after takeovers. Contrary to the view that takeovers create wealth, they argued that 
gains for shareholders are substantially derived from wealth transfers from labour and other 
stakeholders. Drawing on transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985, 1988), the basis of their 
argument is that contracts between firms and employees are partly implicit or incomplete 
because of the costs of writing and enforcing complete contracts. Workers and managers share 
informal understandings such as workers having long-term employment, perhaps even ‘jobs 
for life’. Trust is essential if workers and managers are to abide by these implicit contracts 
(Cording et al., 2014) and if workers are to invest in relationship-specific human capital.  
Those mounting takeovers are not usually bound by these implicit contracts and may 
opportunistically break them to capture some of the rents hitherto secured by labour.  
Replacement of incumbent managers in target companies removes one party to the implicit 
contracts (Bhagat et al., 1990; Conyon et al., 2001), with a series of studies finding extensive 
replacement of target executives after takeovers (Walsh, 1988; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; 
Graebner, 2004; Cording et al., 2014). The key implication is that gains to shareholders come 
from wealth concessions by other stakeholders (Deakin et al., 2003). 
The ‘wealth transfer’ perspective also draws on principal-agent theories of the firm, 
corporate governance and managerial action (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Labour and 
shareholder interests are viewed as competing, with both parties seeking to capture rents. 































































Shareholders bear the agency costs of management-worker deals that provide rents for labour, 
especially if managers exploit their relationships with labour to benefit from a ‘quiet life’ 
themselves (Pendleton et al., 2017). Takeovers enable new shareholders or managers to reduce 
agency costs by extensive restructuring (Maksimovic et al., 2011), including replacement of 
incumbent management and employee lay-offs. Equally, takeovers may arise from principal-
agent problems in the acquiring firms. Managers may engage in takeovers for self-serving 
reasons, such as ‘empire-building’ (Jensen, 1986) or hubris (Roll, 1986). Since these takeovers 
rarely benefit shareholders (Moeller et al., 2005), the argument is that labour will suffer from 
ill-judged transactions. Labour pays for others’ mistakes.  
Alternative theoretical perspectives suggest that shareholders suffer after takeovers 
because labour suffers. The resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) implies that 
takeovers can damage unique capabilities derived from human and social capital because 
valuable employees leave the firm due to uncertainty over integration and future prospects 
(Coff, 1997, 2002; Somaya et al., 2008; Younge et al., 2015). The firm may lose valuable tacit 
knowledge (Dixon, 2000; Zollo and Singh, 2004). If acquirers do not re-establish trust after 
transactions, takeovers may result in lower employee satisfaction (Birkinshaw et al., 2000), 
lower employee commitment (Schweizer and Patzelt, 2012), higher employee turnover (Mayer 
and Kenney, 2004) and poorer organizational integration (Cording et al., 2014), all of which 
can have a negative impact on organisational performance. Another perspective suggests that 
shareholders come out worse than labour. It is argued that, during the uncertainty of the 
integration process, workers and managers are able to exploit their superior information as 
insiders to protect their access to rents, with shareholders bearing the costs of this (Meyer, 
2008). 































































Given these opposing perspectives, what is the evidence on the consequences of 
takeovers for labour and shareholders? Focusing on labour first, there is a sizeable volume of 
evidence that labour does badly after takeovers, suggesting that implicit contracts are broken 
by new owners. Studies in the UK, US, and Europe show that employment typically declines 
by 10-20% after takeovers (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990; Lehto and Bockerman, 2008; Amess 
et al., 2014; Dessaint et al., 2017; Geurts and Biesebroeck, 2017). Firms involved in M&A 
often adopt tougher labour management policies (Goergen et al., 2013) and such transactions 
often reduce their demand for labour (Conyon et al., 2001, 2002, 2004; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 
2004). These changes are typically attributed to restructuring to eliminate duplication and 
surplus capacity (Maksimovic et al., 2011). Employment decline may also arise from higher 
staff turnover (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Cording et al., 2008, Cording et al., 2014). But 
the evidence is not all negative for labour: a recent British study finds growth in employment 
after takeovers in around half of cases (Kuvandikov et al., 2014). There is also some evidence 
of wage increases following acquisitions (Beckmann and Forbes, 2004; Conyon et al., 2004; 
Siegel and Simmons, 2010; Amess et al., 2014). 
One group of shareholders clearly benefits from takeovers – the shareholders of the 
acquired firm. They typically receive a takeover premium of 35-40% (Franks and Mayer, 1996; 
Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Sirower, 1997; Laamanen, 2007), after a run-up in share price 
prior to the takeover announcement (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Given the subsequent 
performance of post-takeover firms, the shareholders of acquiring firms often over-pay target 
shareholders (Sirower, 1997). Does labour bear the costs of this? There is some evidence that 
it might. Bhagat et al., (1990) report that cost savings from lay-offs cover around 10-20% of 
the takeover premium, whilst Krishnan et al., (2007) argue that managers in acquiring firms 
make lay-offs to recover the costs of high takeover premia. We therefore propose the following 
hypothesis: 































































H1. There is a positive relationship between merger-related employee lay-off 
announcements and shareholders’ short-run gains at takeover announcements.
On the whole, shareholders of post-takeover firms tend not to benefit much from 
takeovers. The performance effects of takeovers are typically minimal or negative, whether the 
metric is the accounting or financial performance of the post-acquisition entity (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006). Higson and Elliott (1998) found that acquirers secured zero abnormal 
returns in the three years after takeovers. Subsequently, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006), Cosh 
et al., (2006) and Dargenidou et al., (2016) reported that, on average, abnormal returns are 
negative during the three years after takeovers. Looking wider than the UK, meta-analyses of 
takeover outcomes find that both financial and stock market returns are typically zero or mildly 
negative (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004). The failure of many takeovers is typically 
attributed to the costs of integration, especially those arising from differences in organizational 
cultures and management styles between the merging entities along with loss of human and 
social capital (Datta and Grant, 1990; Datta, 1991; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Pablo, 1994; 
Teerikangas and Very, 2006; Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Bauer and Matzlier, 2014).
The relationship between long-run shareholder abnormal returns and labour may vary 
according to whether these returns are positive or negative. Where abnormal returns are 
negative, the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective predicts that labour bears the costs. By contrast, 
where shareholders achieve positive returns, the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective argues that this 
is likely to be achieved at labour’s expense in the form of cuts to employment or wages/wages 
growth. Other evidence suggests that employment cuts are more likely than wages reductions 
because of ‘wage stickiness’ (Blinder and Choi, 1990) and contractual difficulties in reducing 
wages. Furthermore, wage growth may occur as a concession for reducing employment 































































(‘concession bargaining’). Nevertheless, drawing on the ‘wealth transfer’ view, we test the 
relationship between shareholders’ long-run abnormal returns and labour changes with the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between post-merger workforce reductions and/or 
wages cuts and shareholders’ long-run gains during the post-takeover period.
Research methods
Sample
To test these hypotheses, we analyse whether losses for labour (lay-offs, employment 
reductions and wage changes) are associated with returns to shareholders’ using data on 
domestic takeovers within the UK listed sector 1990-2010. During the period there were 1088 
full takeovers (where acquirers secured more than 50% of target company equity) of UK listed 
companies by other companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. As is common in the 
literature (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Dargenidou et al., 2016), we exclude takeovers 
involving property, financial (banks, investment trusts, exchange-traded funds, etc.), and utility 
companies, because these firms have different asset characteristics, reporting requirements, or 
regulatory regimes to other listed companies (387 cases). This leaves us with 701 transactions. 
Of these, we selected 376 (54% of the total), after removing 325 cases where acquirers 
conducted multiple acquisitions within three years of the observed takeover. This selection 
procedure means that observed employment and wages changes are not contaminated by the 
effects of other transactions. Our final sample is similar to other recent studies of UK takeovers 
(Dargenidou et al., 2016; Mira et al., 2018).  































































Transaction data were collected from Thomson Reuters. These data included M&A 
announcement dates, completion dates, premiums, deal mode, payment type and competing 
bidders. Market and accounting data for one financial year before and three financial years 
after the takeover year (i.e. up to 2014) were retrieved from DataStream and PI Filing Expert. 
Documentary material on lay-offs, takeover motives and post-takeover divestments were 
obtained from the Financial Times. Similar market and accounting data were also collected for 
control companies used in the generation of some of the variables (see below).  
Variables
Shareholders’ gains from takeovers are typically viewed as the difference between the share 
price or share returns and what they may have been had the takeover not occurred or what was 
achieved by otherwise similar firms at the same time. Premium captures the gains at takeover 
for target company shareholders, computed as the percentage difference between the purchase 
price and the market price of the target firm shares 30 days before the first announcement of 
the takeover, divided by the latter price (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). This widely-used 
measure does not take account of movements in the market, and hence does not fully isolate 
the effects of the takeover. A better measure is Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). This 
provides a measure of actual returns relative to what may have been expected in the absence of 
the takeover event. We compute Acquirer (Target) CAR over a three-day event window (one 
day either side of the takeover announcement date), using the market model (Brown and 
Warner, 1985). We estimate the market model parameters using daily share price returns from 
trading between day –300 and day –42 before the takeover announcement and using the 
contemporaneous DataStream Total Returns Index as the market portfolio. This period is 
judged to be both sufficiently lengthy and distant from the takeover to provide parameters that 
are unlikely to be contaminated by takeover speculation and follows similar practice in the 































































literature (e.g. Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Schoenberg, 2006; Bethel et al., 2009; 
Papadakis and Thanos, 2010; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011).
A longer-run measure of shareholder gains from the takeover event is BHAR. This 
isolates the stock price effect of the takeover by comparing the stock price return of the acquirer 
against an otherwise similar control firm at selected time points after the event. Actual returns 
can thereby be compared against expected returns in the absence of the takeover. To calculate 
BHAR, control firms are selected based on industry, size, profitability and non-involvement in 
takeovers for three years either side of the takeover (Barber and Lyon, 1996; Cosh et al., 2006). 
BHAR are calculated for 12, 24 and 36 months after the M&A completion. 
The key independent variables — employee lay-offs, employment change and wages 
change — measure what happens to labour after the takeover. Lay-off announcements may 
impact stock price movements because they signal that acquirers will take a robust approach 
to labour management in the interests of shareholders (Cascio et al., 1997) or that there will be 
challenging times ahead (Cascio, 2002; Datta et al., 2010). Two lay-off variables are derived 
from searches of the national press around and after the M&A announcement date 
(O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan, 1998; Krishnan et al., 2007). Planned lay-offs is a dummy 
variable recording whether acquirers announce plans to lay-off workers after the takeover (22% 
of takeovers). This might have a positive or negative influence on the takeover Premium and 
CAR for the reasons mentioned above. The second (Lay-offs) records whether employee lay-
offs occurred (44% of cases) up to the end of the first full financial year and may be predicted 
to impact BHAR.
Employee lay-offs are not necessarily inconsistent with more positive developments for 
labour since new hires may counteract lay-offs. We therefore use a measure of employment 
change post-takeover by subtracting combined employment of acquirer and target firms pre-































































takeover from the employment of the acquirer firm during the first (third) post-takeover year 
and then dividing this difference by the average of pre- and post-takeover employment (Davis 
et al., 2014). This creates EmpchangeYr1 (EmpchangeYr3) in the first (third) year post-
takeover and we analyse whether these have any association with post-takeover stock returns 
(BHAR). It is also important to record changes in wages, since firms may either seek to reduce 
wages after the takeover (as in the ‘breach of trust’ model) or labour may be able to capture 
rents, possibly in compensation for lay-offs or other employment changes. WagechangeYr1 
(WagechangeYr3) is created using the same method as employment change after computing 
average wages by dividing annual total staff costs (converted into 2013 values using the 
Consumer Price Index) by annual average employment.  
There are likely to be various other influences on the magnitude of M&A-related share 
price returns. These include shareholder power (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993), features of the 
takeover transaction, the objectives and types of takeovers (Walsh, 1988; Walter and Barney, 
1990) and the financial (accounting) performance of the merging firms (Cording et al., 2010). 
It is important, therefore, to control for these, and this lies behind our selection of control 
variables.
Shareholder power may influence the capacity of shareholders to secure high premia, 
CAR and BHAR. Where shareholders hold larger equity stakes, their incentives to monitor are 
greater (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). The combined block-holdings (all those of 3% equity 
or more) for institutional and individual shareholders are used to control for shareholder power 
(Cumming et al., 2018)i. Target (Acquirer) institutional ownership and Target (Acquirer) 
individual ownership at the end of the last pre-takeover fiscal year are controls in the premia 
and CAR estimations. Post-takeover Institutional ownership and Individual ownership at the 
end of the financial year in which the transaction is completed are used in the BHAR 































































regressions. On average, institutional investors hold 25 (29)% of the acquirer (target), whilst 
individual investors hold 8 (15)% respectively just before the takeover. Institutional investors 
continue to have a similar level of ownership post-transaction but individual ownership 
declines. 
Contingent features of the transaction may impact on shareholder returns. Hostile 
takeovers are those where an initial bid was rejected by the target firm management (Denis, 
1994; Franks and Mayer, 1996). Mode of payment can be important: cash transactions usually 
have a positive effect on shareholder returns (Datta et al, 1992; King et al, 2004), possibly 
because of tax benefits (Wansley et al., 1983) or a lower dilutive effect on shareholders, though 
there may be an adverse selection effect (cash-rich firms may make bad acquisitions due to 
higher agency costs, as in Harford (1999)). All-cash payment is a dummy variable for cash 
deals. As the number of competing bidders is likely to increase the premium, we control for 
this with a dummy Competing bidders (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997).
Since shareholder returns are known to vary by size of acquirer (Moeller et al., 2005), 
we control for Target (Acquirer) size based on market capitalisation. We also control for 
Relative employment size (the ratio of acquired firm employment to that of the acquiring firm 
in the year prior to the takeover) as this may affect the capacity of the acquirer to successfully 
digest the target (Cosh et al., 2006). Divestments can proxy for acquisition performance 
(Meschi and Metais, 2015; Schoenberg, 2006) and, therefore, we control for this with 
Divestment dummy.
Takeover objectives are likely to affect post-takeover outcomes (Walsh, 1988; Walter 
and Barney, 1990) and also likely to have implications for labour (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991). Based on newspaper data, and using an inter-rater method, takeovers were classified 
into four types of transaction based on the primary objective: Horizontal growth (47%), 































































Efficiency (25%), Vertical integration (16%) and Diversification (12%). Two of the researchers 
separately classified M&A deals into these four categories of motives, analysing the news 
articles collected from Financial Times. Where there were disagreements, we discussed these 
cases with a third researcher to agree on the final classification. If the acquirer cited business 
growth that could be achieved via acquisition of similar companies with similar products, the 
acquisition was coded as Horizontal growth. If efficiency-based synergy arising from 
integrating operations and eliminating duplication was the primary objective, the acquisition 
was coded as Efficiency. If the primary motive was to incorporate a supplier or customer, the 
acquisition was coded as Vertical integration. M&A transactions enabling acquirers to enter 
new product markets are classified as Diversification deals. This is used as the reference 
category to create three dummy variables for these objectives.
Various measures to control for accounting performance are included, since these will 
likely impact shareholder returns (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 
2011). Drawing on Jensen’s view on the role of free cash flow in shareholder-manager agency 
relationships (Jensen, 1986), we record free cash flows using target and acquirer firms’ 
Operating Cash Flow-to-Total Assets (OCF/TA). We also control for Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Labour Productivity, both of which are normalised using their industry medians. As high 
debt levels may constrain post-takeover financial performance (Hitt et al., 1998), as well as 
limiting managerial autonomy (Jensen, 1986), we control for Leverage, defined as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. We also control for Target run-up, using target firms’ pre-takeover 40 
days CAR, as in Martynova and Renneboog (2011), since target firms often experience share 
price increases in the run-up to the takeover due to information leakage and insider trading 
(Harford, 1999).































































Table 1 provides summary statistics for the control variables (more detailed statistics 
can be found for the dependent variables and key independent variables in Table 2). A summary 
of variable definitions can be found Appendix 1, whilst a correlation table is in Appendix 2.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable names Mean S.D.
Target average number of employees 2,960 8,130
Acquirer average number of employees 12,221 25,639
Target average wage (£000) 34.16 19.05
Acquirer average wage (£000) 36.59 30.22
Target institutional ownership 28.86 20.06
Target individual ownership 14.55 19.33
Acquirer institutional ownership 25.07 18.00
Acquirer individual ownership 7.63 13.20
Institutional ownership 25.07 16.40
Individual ownership 6.39 11.59
Hostile 0.18 0.38
All-cash payment 0.30 0.46
Relative employment size 1.67 10.93
Competing bidders 0.09 0.28
Horizontal growth motive 0.47 0.50
Efficiency motive 0.25 0.43
Vertical integration motive 0.16 0.37
Diversification motive 0.12 0.32
Target size (market value in £mln) 202 591
Target OCF/TA 0.12 0.41
Target ROA 0.10 0.21
Target labour productivity (£000) 138.81 223.48
Target leverage 0.20 0.19
Target run-up 0.09 0.28
Acquirer size (market value in £mln) 1,746 7,992
Acquirer OCF/TA 0.13 0.28
Acquirer ROA 0.16 0.18
Acquirer labour productivity (£000) 180.26 404.95
Acquirer leverage 0.19 0.16
Divestment 0.24 0.43
Notes:  see Appendix 1 for variable definitions.
































































To determine whether shareholder gains (losses) at and after takeovers are associated with 
changes to employment and wages, we run a series of regression models based on the 
following: 
Premium = a + b1Planned Lay-offs + b2Target wage + b3Acquirer wage + b4Controls + e. 
CAR = a + b1Planned Lay-offs + b2Target wage + b3Acquirer wage + b4Controls + e. 
BHAR = a + b1Lay-offs + b2Empchange + b3Wagechange + b4Controls + e.
The premium and CAR models implicitly assume efficient markets in that labour 
changes are assumed to be priced-in to share prices more or less immediately. The BHAR 
models also incorporate lags in key independent variables to enable a causal dimension 
consistent with the proposition that wealth is transferred from labour to capital: the 24 months 
and 36 months BHAR models incorporate labour changes in Year 1. We use Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) in all regressions and assume that residuals follow a normal distribution. The 
use of robust standard errors, however, provides a conservative approach. Those observations 
with large residuals (>2.75 S.D.) are excluded to prevent extreme cases obscuring the main 
pattern of results. This leads to a very slight reduction in sample size. There is also sample 
attrition each year due to de-listing of some acquiring firms. 
Results
Prior to presenting the regression results, we present summary information of the effects of 
takeovers on shareholders and employees in Table 2. This provides important context for what 
comes later.































































Shareholders’ gains from takeovers
As expected, Table 2 shows that there is a substantial premium accruing to the shareholders of 
takeover targets (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Sirower, 1997). On average, this is 36% 
(Panel A), and the difference between the premiums of no planned lay-offs and planned lay-
offs sub-samples is not significant. Target company shareholders earn significantly higher 
(19%) CAR in the three days around the takeover announcement, and this is similar for the two 
sub-samples. Acquirer shareholders make a small loss in both sub-samples (c.f. Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Bethel et al., 2009).
Looking to the longer term (Panel B), on average, shareholders receive negative BHAR 
in each post-takeover year. This is consistent with previous evidence on shareholder returns 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006; Cording et al., 2010). But there is variation in returns: whilst 
most firms achieve negative returns, a substantial minority (45%) secure positive abnormal 
returns. Our results also show that the differences between the BHAR of the no lay-offs and 
lay-offs sub-samples are not significantly different at p < 0.05.
Changes in employment and wages 
Panel A shows that employee lay-offs are planned at the time of the takeover in 82 (22%) 
cases, whilst Panel B shows that 167 (44%) takeovers have lay-offs by the end of the first full 
financial year. Panel C shows actual employment changes at various points after the takeover. 
It includes both ‘raw’ and adjusted (relative to control firms) average employment change after 
the takeoverii. In the full sample, mean unadjusted employment change is slightly negative (but 
positive, though not significantly so, when compared with control firms). In the no lay-offs 
sub-sample employment growth is 8% (12%) in the first (third) post-takeover year, while in 
the lay-offs sub-sample employment decline is 12% (20%) in the first (third) post-takeover 
year. Adjusted employment changes show similar results, with the differences between the two 































































groups of firms significant at p < 0.01. However, employees benefit from growth in wages after 
the takeover (Panel D). Adjusting for control firms, wage growth is smaller (negative in Year 
3), but wage increases in the two sub-samples are not significantly different. 
Table 2. Shareholder gains, employment and wage changes







Panel A: Premium and CAR
Number of M&A deals 376 294 82
Acquisition premium (%) 35.99 35.32 38.39 -3.07
Target CAR (%) 19.03*** 19.12*** 17.83*** 1.29
Acquirer CAR (%) -1.06*** -1.03*** -1.20* 0.17








Number of M&A deals 376 209 167
12 months BHAR (%) -6.08* -5.88* -6.32* 0.44
24 months BHAR (%) -14.78*** -10.82** -19.74*** 8.92
36 months BHAR (%) -16.88** -16.52** -17.34** 0.82
Panel C: Post-takeover employment changes
Employment change in Year 1 (%, unadjusted) -0.74 8.31*** -12.05*** 20.35***
Employment change in Year 3 (%, unadjusted) -2.26 11.81*** -19.55*** 31.36***
Employment change in Year 1 (%, adjusted) 0.17 6.52* -7.79*** 14.31***
Employment change in Year 3 (%, adjusted) 1.27 8.80* -7.97* 16.77**
Panel D: Post-takeover wages changes
Wages change in Year 1 (%, unadjusted) 6.28*** 5.48*** 7.28*** -1.80
Wages change in Year 3 (%, unadjusted) 10.24*** 8.31*** 12.60*** -4.29
Wages change in Year 1 (%, adjusted) 0.63 -0.32 1.83 -2.15
Wages change in Year 3 (%, adjusted) -1.57 -2.88 0.04 -2.91
Notes: Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. The statistical significance of the mean values is tested against zero 
using the single sample t-test. The equality of means of the same variable between two sub-samples is tested using the two-sample t-test 
with equal variances.
Overall, the primary beneficiaries of takeovers are the shareholders of the target firm. 
On average, the shareholders of the merged firm suffer, whilst labour also suffers from small 
net employment reductions. However, remaining employees benefit from wage increases. So 
far then, there is little evidence to suggest that shareholders benefit at labour’s expense.
Do shareholders benefit at labour’s expense at the takeover? 































































The results in Table 3 focus on shareholder returns at the time of the takeover, and are used to 
test Hypothesis 1. The regressions show the relationships between the takeover premium, target 
and acquirer CAR, and a range of possible influences, including planned lay-off 
announcementsiii. Besides the labour variables, the regressions control for the characteristics 
and the objectives of the transaction, size and performance of target and acquirer firms. For 
Hypothesis 1 to be proven, there needs to be a positive association significant at p < 0.05 
between lay-offs and shareholder returns. Model 1 has the Premium as the dependent variable, 
Models 2 and 3 have Target CAR, and Model 4 has Acquirer CAR. Model 2 replicates Model 
1 in terms of independent variables, whilst Models 3 and 4 add the Premium, on the basis that 
the premium will contribute to shareholder returns.  
Significant influences on the Premium (Model 1) are hostility and individual equity 
stakes. Among other control variables, Relative employment size, Target run-up and various 
features of the target and acquirer, such as size and leverage, are also associated with the 
Premium. It is a similar picture for Target CAR (Model 2), though Hostile becomes 
insignificant and Acquirer OCF/TA become significant. Takeovers aimed at expanding 
markets, but not enhancing efficiency, (relative to diversification) have a significant, positive 
relationship with Target CAR. Model 3 replicates Model 2 but with the inclusion of the 
Premium. This latter variable unsurprisingly has a strong positive relationship with Target CAR 
and leads to a substantial improvement in model fit. Model 4 has a weaker fit than the others, 
but it is worth noting that Acquirer wage, All-cash payment, Relative employment size, Target 
leverage, Target run-up and Acquirer labour productivity show significant relationships with 
Acquirer CAR at p < 0.05 or better.































































Table 3. Planned lay-offs and shareholder returns at takeover announcements
Premium Target CAR Target CAR Acquirer CAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Planned lay-offs 0.058 -0.105 -0.076 -0.147*  
Target wage 0.011 -0.019 -0.021 -0.016
Acquirer wage -0.039 0.034 0.043 -0.129** 
Premium 0.575*** -0.034
Hostile 0.109* -0.017 -0.081 0.033
Target institutional ownership -0.002 -0.017 -0.014
Target individual ownership 0.154* 0.003 -0.031
Acquirer institutional ownership 0.030
Aquirer individual ownership 0.035
All-cash payment -0.057 -0.008 0.035 0.143** 
Relative employment size 0.202** 0.192* 0.094 -0.176*  
Competing bidders 0.076 0.061 0.018 -0.043
Horizontal growth -0.007 0.209** 0.183* -0.08
Efficiency -0.068 0.166 0.178* 0.042
Vertical integration -0.042 0.065 0.061 -0.076
Target size (market value) -0.332** -0.415*** -0.229* 0.151
Target OCF/TA -0.052 -0.009 0.011 0.014
Target ROA 0.025 0.021 0.043 -0.057
Target labour productivity 0.055 0.082 0.061 0.051
Target leverage -0.142** -0.193*** -0.112** 0.110*  
Target run-up 0.348*** -0.141* -0.306*** 0.123*  
Acquirer size (market value) 0.439*** 0.565*** 0.301** -0.071
Acquirer OCF/TA -0.008 0.110** 0.071* 0.059
Acquirer ROA 0.009 0.008 -0.008 -0.062
Acquirer labour productivity 0.014 -0.01 -0.001 0.162***
Acquirer leverage 0.04 0.117* 0.08 -0.035
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
F-statistic 3.299*** 2.553*** 5.596*** 2.488***
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.148 0.398 0.100
Number of observations 372 370 370 370
Notes: OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Standardized beta coefficients are 
reported. Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Turning to the key variables of interest, Model 1 shows that Planned lay-offs are not 
significantly associated with the takeover premium. Models 2 and 3 similarly indicate a lack 
of relationship between Planned lay-offs and Target CAR, whilst Model 4 shows that Planned 
lay-offs are negatively associated with Acquirer CAR. Instead, target shareholders benefit from 































































takeovers based on expanding activities (Horizontal growth), low leverage, and a small size 
relative to the acquirer (presumably making the takeover more readily digestible). In other 
words, target shareholders benefit from good future prospects for the merged company rather 
than value extraction from labour. These findings therefore contradict the ‘breach of trust’ 
hypothesis, and Hypothesis 1 is not proven. As such, they are consistent with the earlier 
findings of Beckmann and Forbes (2004). The significant negative relationship between 
Planned lay-offs and Acquirer CAR, with a lay-off announcement reducing returns by a 0.15 
standard deviation point, suggests that some takeovers have challenging prospectsiv, and 
indicates that the stock market views jobs cuts as a bad sign rather than a source of additional 
returns to shareholders. This is consistent with the idea that labour and shareholders experience 
‘pain-sharing’ or ‘equal misery’ post-takeover (Beckmann and Forbes, 2004).
In summary, these findings contradict the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective and we find that 
Hypothesis 1 (which focuses on shareholder gains at the time of the takeover) is not supported. 
There is no evidence of wealth transfer from labour to shareholders.
The effect of changes in employment and wages on long-term shareholder returns (BHAR)
Hypothesis 2 proposes that long-term shareholder returns post-takeover will be associated with 
adverse changes for labour. Relevant regression results are reported in Table 4. All models 
analyse the impact of post-takeover actual Lay-offs on BHAR. Model 1 analyses the impact of 
changes in employment and wages in the first year post-takeover, whilst Models 2 and 3 report 
the lagged effects of these on Year 2 and 3 BHAR. Model 4 reports the effect of labour changes 
in Year 3. For Hypothesis 2 to be supported, there needs to be significant positive coefficients 
on the lay-offs variable and/or significant negative coefficients on the employment and wage 
change variables.































































Model fit in Models 1 and 2 is weak but Models 3 and 4 have stronger R2. Amongst the 
control variables, the strongest influences on shareholder returns are ROA, Labour Productivity 
and the size of the new company (c.f. Cosh et al., 2006). Premium is not significantly associated 
with BHAR, although the sign of this variable is negative. Model 2 shows that hostile takeovers 
generate significantly higher shareholder returns in Year 2 (c.f. Sudarsanam and Mahate, 
2006), though these effects dissipate in the following year. The presence of institutional 
blockholders is associated with higher BHAR in Years 1 and 2.  
Table 4. Labour changes and post-takeover shareholder gains
12m BHAR 24m BHAR 36m BHAR 36m BHAR   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Lay-offs -0.084 -0.004 0.027 0.027
EmpchangeYr1 0.003 -0.011 0.012
WagechangeYr1 0.077 0.114* 0.134*
EmpchangeYr3 0.198** 
WagechangeYr3 0.157** 
Premium -0.038 -0.082 -0.09 -0.099
Hostile 0.104 0.139* 0.082 0.072
Institutional ownership 0.123* 0.142* 0.094 0.086
Individual ownership -0.097 0.014 0.002 -0.015
All-cash payment 0.065 0.073 0.069 0.069
Relative employment size -0.042 -0.028 0.094 0.116
Horizontal growth 0.063 -0.089 -0.009 -0.013
Efficiency 0.132 -0.098 -0.033 -0.012
Vertical integration 0.086 -0.067 0.058 0.043
Size (market value) in Year 0 0.039 0.159* 0.166* 0.156*  
ROA 0.171** 0.125* 0.232*** 0.180** 
Labour productivity 0.034 0.116* 0.131* 0.123*  
Leverage in Year 0 0.019 0.042 -0.03 -0.025
Divestments -0.09 -0.141* -0.093 -0.048
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
F-statistic 2.005*** 2.355*** 2.710*** 2.680***
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.12 0.201 0.226
Number of observations 370 342 316 316
Notes : OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Standardized beta coefficients are 
reported. Significance levels: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.































































Two Year 1 labour measures — Lay-offs and EmpchangeYr1 — are insignificant in all 
models. Contrary to Hypothesis 2 and predictions from the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective, 
Models 2 and 3 indicate that wage growth just after the takeover (WagechangeYr1) has a 
positive lagged impact on BHAR in Years 2 and 3. A one standard deviation higher growth in 
WagechangeYr1 generates 0.13 standard deviation higher BHAR in Year 3. This finding is 
more consistent with human capital, resource-based, and efficiency wages perspectives than 
‘wealth transfer’. It implies that if labour does well, shareholders will subsequently benefit.
Model 4 shows that EmpchangeYr3 and WagechangeYr3 are positively associated with 
shareholder returns at the end of that year. A one standard deviation increase in EmpchangeYr3 
is associated with a 0.20 standard deviation higher BHAR in Year 3, while a one standard 
deviation increase in WagechangeYr3 means 0.16 standard deviation higher BHAR. The model 
fits for Year 3 results are substantially greater than those for earlier years, in part because of 
the sizeable coefficients on the labour variables. When shareholders do well, employees 
benefit, and equally, when they do badly, labour does so also (given that there are both positive 
and negative values of BHAR). In place of ‘wealth transfer’, the results are more consistent 
with either ‘pain-sharing’ or ‘gain-sharing’. Hypothesis 2, therefore, is not supported. Given 
the nature of these findings, and the variation in shareholder returns in the sample, we now 
examine in more detail how the results may vary according to whether shareholder returns are 
positive or negative.  
Sub-sample analysis: pain-sharing or gain-sharing?
The positive relationships between labour and shareholder returns in Table 4 could be due to 
‘pain-sharing’ and/or ‘gain-sharing’ given that the dependent variables and employment/wages 
changes have both negative and positive values. To investigate this, we segment the sample 
according to whether shareholders earn positive or negative abnormal returns and re-run the 































































previous regressions for each of these. Negative BHAR are converted to absolute numbers to 
ease interpretation and comparability with the results for positive BHAR. Results are reported 
in Table 5. 
Amongst firms with positive BHAR in the first year, absence of lay-offs is associated 
with more positive BHAR at the end of the first year (Model 1), and the effect is sizeable. At 
the same time, employment and wages changes do not have a significant relationship with 
BHAR, indicating that ‘pain-sharing’, ‘gain-sharing’ or ‘wealth transfer’ have not taken place. 
The same can be said for the second year after the takeover (Models 3 and 5), though the signs 
differ from those in the first year.  
It is a rather different picture amongst those firms that experience negative BHAR at 
the end of the first year after the takeover. Whilst the employment and wages change variables 
remain insignificant, the negative coefficient on lay-offs (significant at p < 0.05) indicates that 
lay-offs are associated with smaller negative BHAR (Model 2). This may indicate that those 
firms doing badly that instigate lay-offs achieve some remedial benefits for shareholders, 
consistent with Cascio et al.’s (1997) results. The coefficients on lay-offs in Year 2 and 3 
negative BHAR models (4, 6 and 8) are of a similar sign and magnitude, though do not achieve 
significance at p < 0.05.
Although most of the coefficients for Year 1 employment change (and all for wages 
changes) are insignificant, in Model 4, employment change is negatively associated (at p < 
0.05) with negative BHAR one year later. This indicates that larger employment reductions are 
associated with larger negative BHAR and suggests that when employees collectively suffer as 
a result of takeovers, shareholders also suffer in the longer-run (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Stahl 
and Voigt, 2008). These results therefore support a ‘pain-sharing’ interpretation and are 































































consistent with those perspectives suggesting that dissipation of valuable human capital after 
takeovers harms performance (Cording et al., 2014).





































Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Lay-offs -0.294** -0.177* -0.142 -0.117 -0.04 -0.188 0.026 -0.156
EmpchangeYr1 0.007 0.107 -0.011 -0.197* -0.199 -0.162
WagechangeYr1 0.071 -0.084 -0.097 -0.118 -0.078 -0.102
EmpchangeYr3 -0.001 -0.212*  
WagechangeYr3 0.177* -0.093
Premium -0.088 -0.006 -0.009 0.008 -0.08 0.095 -0.157* 0.089
Hostile 0.084 -0.003 0.065 0.005 -0.033 0.087 -0.061 0.062
All other control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-statistic 2.072* 1.541 1.15 2.921*** 11.165*** 2.513*** 7.526*** 2.218***
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.077 0.062 0.221 0.236 0.22 0.297 0.221
Number of observations 165 203 159 184 154 161 153 162
Notes : OLS, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Standardized beta coefficients are reported. Significance levels: *p < 0.05; 
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Models 7 and 8 report regressions where EmpchangeYr3 and WagechangeYr3 are key 
independent variables. There are substantial differences in the size of the EmpchangeYr3 
coefficients between the positive and negative BHAR sub-samples. Employment change is 
negatively related to negative BHAR (significant at p < 0.05), but there is no relationship where 
BHAR is positive. These particular results contradict a ‘wealth transfer’ perspective and 
provide further support for a ‘pain-sharing’ perspective when shareholders have negative 
BHAR. By contrast, wage change is positively associated with positive BHAR, suggesting that 
‘gain-sharing’ takes place as far as wages are concerned when firms are doing well. This is also 
consistent with those perspectives that suggest that high wages can enhance performance by 
retaining and developing the human capital stock.
Overall, there is evidence of ‘pain-sharing’ when shareholders achieve negative returns, 
and partial evidence of ‘gain-sharing’ (higher wages) where shareholders do well.  There is no 































































evidence to support a ‘wealth transfer’ view that shareholders benefit at labour’s expense. 
There are no clear links between employment reductions and positive returns, whilst lay-offs 
have a negative impact on these returns. These results therefore provide further evidence to 
contradict Hypothesis 2, and suggest instead that labour and shareholders’ interests after 
takeovers function in tandem rather than at the expense of the other. Indeed, there is some 
limited evidence that when labour suffers, shareholders subsequently pay. 
Discussion and conclusions
This paper assesses whether shareholder returns after takeovers are achieved at the expense of 
employees, as predicted by the ‘wealth transfer’ hypothesis. To do this we evaluate the 
association between planned lay-offs, actual lay-offs, employment and wage changes and 
shareholder returns at the time of the takeover and in the three year period afterwards. In 
general, the results indicate that takeover gains are not generated by transferring wealth from 
employees to shareholders. Acquirer shareholders’ short-run gains (CAR) are inversely related 
with planned lay-offs. The latter have no impact on the takeover premium or target CAR, 
indicating that the gains to target shareholders are not achieved at labour’s expense (c.f. 
Krishnan et al., 2007). After the takeover, there is a positive association between employment 
(wage) growth and shareholders’ long-run gains. Where acquirer shareholders do well, so does 
labour, as confirmed by the sub-sample analysis. This analysis shows that in some cases 
shareholders and employees share gains: shareholders earn higher BHAR, while employees 
receive higher wage growth than in comparator firms. However, lay-offs are associated with 
shareholder losses when BHAR is negative, providing evidence of ‘pain-sharing’.  
Overall, these results suggest that the ‘wealth transfer’ perspective has limited utility in 
the analysis of the effects of takeovers. They therefore contradict those theoretical perspectives 
that emphasise the conflicting interests of labour and shareholders and provide an instance 































































where, instead, their interests are complementary (Jackson, 2005). More appropriate theoretical 
perspectives are those which stress the damage that employment reductions or decline in 
employee trust in management can do to shareholder returns after takeovers (Zollo and Meier, 
2008; Cording et al., 2014). Paradoxically, the theoretical basis of these views and the ‘wealth 
transfer’ perspective is not dissimilar. Both draw attention to the important role of human 
capital in the value of the firm but differ in their analysis as to how far shareholders can over-
ride it.  
Our contribution is not just that we cast doubt on the ‘wealth transfer’ view.  The 
findings also provide evidence of complementary interests between shareholders and 
employees. We go further by distinguishing between ‘pain-sharing’ and ‘gain-sharing’. When 
shareholders do well, labour does well, at least in terms of wages. When shareholders 
experience pain, so does labour. Furthermore, through the use of lagged variables, we are able 
to provide evidence that is supportive of a causal interpretation in relation to human capital. 
Where labour benefits from wages growth, shareholders subsequently achieve higher BHAR, 
though we are hesitant to make a stronger causal claim given the nature of our data. Our data 
also precludes a definitive assessment of the processes whereby wages growth impacts on 
shareholder returns, though there are a variety of possibilities such as re-establishment or 
reinforcement of trust (Cording et al., 2014), reductions in employee resistance to change 
(Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), reduced employee turnover (Cording et al., 2008), and 
limitation of knowledge transfer to competitors via staff exits (Younge et al., 2015). Wage 
growth may also encourage transfer of knowledge and cooperation between employees in the 
merging firms (Stahl et al., 2011; Junni et al., 2015; Sarala et al., 2016), and this may lead to 
successful organisational integration (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Cording et al., 2014). It is 
possible also that powerful ‘insiders’ are able to capture some of the gains of good post-































































takeover performance. Meanwhile, the response of employment rather than wages to adverse 
performance is consistent with economic views of ‘wage stickiness’ (Blinder and Choi, 1990).
The implication for managers is that they should not underestimate the role of human 
capital when mounting takeovers. A clear message from the results is that takeovers that 
incorporate explicit plans to lay-off employees after the transaction do not generally appeal to 
the stock market, presumably because lay-offs signal that the takeover is risky. Shareholders 
receive lower abnormal returns at takeover when there are lay-off plans, and positive BHAR 
later on are likely to be smaller if lay-offs have taken place. Takeovers that are designed to 
transfer wealth from other stakeholders such as labour to shareholders may well not succeed. 
Instead, the implication of the longer-run results is that acquirers that look after employees — 
as proxied by greater wage growth — are likely to have higher positive returns. As indicated 
above, there are a variety of reasons why this is the case. There are lessons for labour also here: 
its appeal to shareholders to be well-treated during and after takeovers could well appeal to 
shareholder self-interest.        
There are several limitations to the research, which should be borne in mind in 
interpreting the results. We have not been able to explore the factors external to the firm that 
influence which workers experience lay-offs or secure wage increases (Bauer et al, 2018, 
Siegel and Simons, 2010). A further limitation is that our data sources preclude examination 
of alternatives to lay-offs such as voluntary redundancies or early retirements (Goergen et al., 
2013). In addition, there could be significant labour displacement and churn, masked by the 
aggregate employment figures. Labour may also be affected in other ways not captured in this 
study, such as by changes to pension provision (Pontiff et al., 1990). And takeovers may 
generate a sense of insecurity that has adverse effects on employee well-being, labour turnover, 
and employee performance. These dynamics of labour restructuring may negatively impact on 































































implicit labour contracts and subsequently on the acquirers’ performance in the longer term. 
Many of these outcomes have been highlighted in previous literature on the labour outcomes 
of takeovers, but there is a case for examining them more closely in relation to financial 
measures of shareholder outcomes. 
A further issue is that the relationships observed here may, to some extent, be context-
specific, with labour market flexibility and efficiency moderating the relationship between 
gains and losses to labour and capital (Bauer et al., 2018). Where there is lower labour market 
flexibility, the capacity of labour to resist post-takeover restructuring could mean that there is 
a greater net transfer of wealth from shareholders to labour. Comparative studies located in 
varying labour market contexts could illuminate these possibilities. A further issue concerns 
cross-border transactions, and the possibility that shareholders in one country load the costs of 
takeovers onto employees in another. Unfortunately, we were unable to examine cross-border 
takeovers because of the difficulties in integrating financial and company data from different 
national settings. We know of no direct evidence on the extent to which wealth transfers occur 
in cross-border transactions, though there is public disquiet that foreign takeovers have adverse 
impacts on domestic employees. It is possible that wealth sharing is more prevalent than wealth 
transfer in cross-border transactions because foreign acquirers tend to takeover good 
performing firms to expand their market share (Bandick and Karpaty, 2011).   
Within the confines of our national focus, there are also other limitations. The exclusion 
of serial acquirers (to avoid ‘contamination’ of the employment data) may exclude those 
companies that are better at securing wealth transfers from labour to shareholders or, 
alternatively, those that are better at achieving successful integration and better outcomes for 
labour. The potential bias may run either way. A further limitation is that we have limited 
information on the identity of major shareholders. For instance, our data sources do not allow 































































us to differentiate between sub-types of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, pension 
funds, and sovereign wealth funds, each of which may have different approaches to monitoring 
their investee companies (see Gospel et al., 2014). Our focus on the listed sector also means 
that we cannot examine the role of private equity acquisitions, which may involve greater 
wealth transfer from employees to shareholders. Future research should attempt to identify the 
types of institutional investors, their investment horizons and their investment strategies, as 
these may affect the nature and extent of labour outcomes after takeovers.
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Appendix 1  Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
Premium The difference between the purchase price and the target firm share price 
30 days before the initial takeover announcement date, divided by the 
target firm share price 30 days before the initial takeover announcement 
date (Source: Thomson Reuters and DataStream).
CAR The 3-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) calculated 
using the market model. The market model parameters are estimated 
using the return data for the trading days between -300 and -42 before the 
event. (Source: DataStream).
BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return (in percentage points) for acquiring firms 
over 12, 24 and 36 months periods after the announcement month, relative 
to non-acquirer control firms. (Source: DataStream). 
Labour variables (key independent variables) 
Planned lay-offs 
(0,1)
Equals 1 if media reports around the time of the M&A announcement or 
within a few days of the transaction indicate post-merger lay-offs will 
occur. (Source: Financial Times and other press reports).
Lay-offs (0,1) Equals 1 if the acquirer makes at least 1 per cent of the combined 
workforce of th  acquired and the acquiring firms redundant by the end of 




The percentage employment change, measured as the difference between 
the post-takeover employment of the acquiring firm in Year 1 (Year 3) 
and pre-takeover combined employment of the acquiring and the acquired 
firm, divided by the average of pre- and post-takeover employment. This 




The ratio of annual total staff costs in real terms (converted into 2013 
values using the Consumer Price Index) of the target (acquirer) firm 
during the financial year immediately before takeover to the number of 
workers employed during that year. This is adjusted using wages in the 
matched control firm. (Source: DataStream).
WagechangeYr1 
(3)
The percentage wage change, measured as the difference between the 
post-takeover wage (total staff costs in real terms divided by employment) 
in the acquiring firm in Year 1 (Year 3) and pre-takeover combined 
average wages of the acquired and acquiring firms, divided by the average 
of pre- and post-takeover wages. This is adjusted according to wages 





The total percentage of ownership of the target’s (acquirer) all 
institutional shareholders owning more than 3 per cent of ordinary shares 




The total percentage of ownership of the target’s (acquirer) individual 
shareholders, including managers, owning more than 3 per cent of 
ordinary shares in the year before the takeover (Source: PI Filing Expert).
Institutional 
ownership
The total percentage of ownership of all institutional shareholders owning 
more than 3 per cent of ordinary shares in the year after the takeover 
(Source: PI Filing Expert).
































































The combined percentage of ownership of all individual shareholders, 
including managers, owning more than 3 per cent of ordinary shares in the 
year after the takeover (Source: PI Filing Expert).
Deal characteristics
Hostile (0,1) Equals 1 if an acquisition is defined as hostile takeover, where an initial 
bid was rejected by the target firm management (Source: Thomson 
Reuters and Financial Times).
All-cash payment 
(0,1)
Equals 1 if an acquisition was financed entirely by cash payments 
(Source: Thomson Reuters). 
Relative 
employment size 
The ratio of the acquired firm’s employment to that of the acquiring firm 




Equals 1 if more than one firm was involved in the deal (Source: 
Thomson Reuters)
Divestment (0,1) Equals 1 if the acquirer makes a significant asset divestment after the 




Equals 1 if a M&A deal involves acquiring a rival firm and the acquiring 
firm managers indicate business growth and expansion as the main 
objective of the deal (as reported in the press), 0 otherwise (Source: 
Financial Times).  
Efficiency Equals 1 if the acquiring firm managers specifically indicate 
rationalisation, cost savings and other required improvements in the 
targeted firm as the main objective of the takeover transaction (as reported 
in the press), 0 otherwise (Source: Financial Times).  
Vertical 
integration
Equals 1 if a M&A deal involves two firms where there is some type of 
business relationship between them, such as supplier or customer (as 
reported in the press), 0 otherwise (Source: Financial Times).  
Diversification Equals 1 if a M&A deal is undertaken by a conglomerate acquirer, whose 
managers indicate business diversification as the main objective of the 
deal (as reported in the press), 0 otherwise (Source: Financial Times).  
Firm characteristics
Size The share price 42 days prior to the initial takeover announcement 
multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. Log transformed. 
(Source: DataStream).
OCF/TA Operating Cash flow-to-Total Assets, defined as sales minus cost of goods 
sold (excluding depreciation), selling, general and administrative 
expenses and working capital change, divided by total assets. (Source: 
DataStream).
ROA Return on Assets, defined as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and 
Depreciation (EBITDA) divided by the book value of total assets at the 




Sales per employee minus respective industry median labour productivity 
(Source: DataStream).  
Leverage The ratio of the acquirer’s total debt to its total assets at the end of the 
takeover completion fiscal year. (Source: DataStream). 
Target run-up Cumulative abnormal returns of the target firm during the 40 days from 
day -42 to day -2 before the initial takeover announcement. (Source: 
DataStream).




























































































































Appendix 2. Correlations table
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Acquisition premium  1
2 Target CAR  0.5182* 1
3 Acquirer CAR  -0.0009 -0.0357 1
4 12 months BHAR   -0.0185 -0.0147 0.0676 1
5 24 months BHAR  -0.0279 -0.0677 0.0207 0.6467* 1
6 36 months BHAR  -0.0729 -0.0423 0.0143 0.4575* 0.7494* 1
7 Planned lay-offs  0.0364 -0.0233 -0.013 -0.0315 -0.0944 -0.04 1
8 Actual lay-offs  0.0343 0.0231 0.1343* -0.004 -0.0528 -0.0031 0.5908* 1
9 EmpchangeY1 0.0474 -0.0291 -0.0154 0.08 0.0436 0.0433 -0.2218* -0.2846* 1
10 EmpchangeY3 -0.0386 0.0019 0.0064 0.1280* 0.1442* 0.1691* -0.2819* -0.3164* 0.7533* 1
11 WagechangeYr1 0.091 0.0451 0.0047 -0.0101 0.0732 0.0757 0.0631 0.0421 -0.3419* -0.2226* 1
12 WagechangeYr3 0.1365* 0.0723 -0.0131 0.0301 0.0729 0.0974 0.0621 0.0788 -0.2537* -0.3585* 0.6607* 1
13 Target institutional ownership -0.0468 -0.0087 0.0266 0.0406 -0.03 -0.0477 -0.1085* -0.0559 0.1112* 0.1186* -0.0552 -0.0492 1
14 Target individual ownership 0.0489 0.0106 0.0635 -0.0276 -0.033 -0.0318 -0.1860* -0.1396* 0.0994 0.1004 0.0043 0.016 -0.3086* 1
15 Acquirer institutional ownership -0.0405 -0.0656 0.0035 0.0244 0.0766 0.039 -0.099 -0.087 0.0144 -0.012 -0.031 -0.0461 0.1714* -0.0687 1
16 Acquirer individual ownership 0.0804 -0.0123 0.0146 -0.0469 -0.0819 -0.0733 -0.1835* -0.2501* 0.1336* 0.0855 -0.0407 -0.0567 -0.022 0.1743* -0.1178* 1
17 Institutional ownership -0.0464 -0.0484 0.0518 0.0445 0.0963 0.0769 -0.1048* -0.0553 0.0606 -0.0191 -0.0293 -0.0265 0.2327* -0.0491 0.7376* -0.1111* 1
18 Individual ownership 0.0148 -0.0727 -0.031 -0.0499 -0.0478 -0.0618 -0.1851* -0.2504* 0.1059* 0.0402 -0.074 -0.0592 -0.0093 0.1686* -0.1170* 0.8541* -0.1354* 1
19 Horizontal growth motive 0.0265 -0.0023 -0.0217 -0.0214 0.0169 0.0278 -0.2400* -0.3176* 0.1905* 0.2066* -0.0596 -0.0193 -0.05 0.1024* 0.0405 0.1215* 0.0035 0.0877 1
20 Efficiency motive -0.0513 0.057 0.1130* 0.0444 -0.0295 -0.0111 0.4090* 0.3987* -0.2193* -0.2278* -0.0215 0.0111 0.0011 -0.0874 -0.0248 -0.1383* 0.0248 -0.0937 -0.5445*
21 Vertical integration motive -0.0162 -0.0465 -0.0557 0.0394 -0.0085 -0.0279 -0.0926 -0.0159 0.0549 0.0553 0.0677 0.0193 0.0022 0.0644 -0.0798 0.0207 -0.1019* 0.0101 -0.4150*
22 Diversification motive 0.0464 -0.0199 -0.0547 -0.0719 0.0232 0.0038 -0.072 -0.0257 -0.0635 -0.0724 0.0438 -0.0074 0.0736 -0.1151* 0.062 -0.0262 0.0781 -0.0217 -0.3433*
23 Target size -0.0152 -0.0224 0.0443 0.0304 0.0227 0.0384 0.4026* 0.3446* -0.0541 -0.0468 0.0236 0.0404 -0.0578 -0.3766* -0.1121* -0.3548* -0.1311* -0.3469* -0.1676*
24 Target OCF/TA 0.0324 0.0135 0.0459 -0.0331 0.0297 0.0211 -0.0092 0.0238 0.081 0.0333 -0.1171* -0.0385 0.0538 -0.0203 0.0128 -0.1426* -0.0474 -0.1280* 0.0858
25 Target ROA 0.0216 0.0264 -0.0235 0.0931 0.1280* 0.0857 0.0109 -0.0337 0.1161* 0.0663 -0.028 0.0005 0.0256 0.056 -0.0395 -0.0667 0.0017 -0.083 -0.0269
26 Target labour productivity -0.011 -0.0055 0.0856 0.0055 0.0014 0.0623 0.1048* 0.1046* -0.0158 -0.0073 -0.0453 0.0308 -0.1495* 0.0128 -0.067 -0.0168 -0.1436* 0.0054 0.006
27 Target leverage -0.1361* -0.1169* 0.0955 -0.002 0.0292 0.0667 0.0608 0.0186 -0.0699 -0.0727 0.0108 0.0928 -0.0315 -0.0937 -0.0109 0.0372 -0.0164 0.0223 -0.0118
28 Target run-up 0.3486* -0.0637 0.0498 0.0541 0.0851 0.0039 -0.0338 0.0108 -0.0019 -0.0841 -0.0722 0.0161 -0.0665 0.0703 -0.0688 0.0816 -0.0321 0.0636 0.0436
29 Acquirer size 0.1377* 0.1326* 0.0695 0.0417 0.0891 0.0876 0.2914* 0.3394* 0.045 0.0489 0.0058 0.0462 -0.0307 -0.2148* -0.2842* -0.3930* -0.2389* -0.3730* -0.1669*
30 Acquirer OCF/TA 0.0549 0.0506 0.0422 -0.0067 0.0614 0.0847 0.0656 0.0725 0.0102 0.0004 -0.1096* -0.0062 0.0672 -0.1074* -0.0618 -0.0733 -0.0521 -0.0847 -0.0465
31 Acquirer ROA 0.0748 0.0463 -0.0507 0.0443 0.0545 0.0094 -0.0205 -0.062 0.2230* 0.1074 -0.0029 0.0267 0.0691 -0.0619 -0.0548 -0.045 -0.0551 -0.0488 0.0444
32 Acquirer labour productivity -0.0432 -0.0218 0.1088* 0.0514 0.0524 0.0386 0.011 -0.0231 -0.0642 -0.0399 -0.0015 0.011 -0.012 0.0633 0.1148* -0.045 0.1642* -0.0179 -0.0041
33 Acquirer leverage 0.0172 0.046 0.0403 0.0373 0.0388 0.0002 0.1208* 0.1135* -0.0559 0.0205 0.0839 0.0809 0.0197 -0.0584 -0.1013* -0.1178* -0.1464* -0.1152* -0.0567
34 Hostile 0.1537* 0.004 0.0004 0.0928 0.0829 0.0602 0.1748* 0.1293* -0.1294* -0.0703 0.1189* 0.0835 -0.0096 -0.1794* -0.1058* 0.0083 -0.1033* 0.0195 -0.0771
35 All-cash payment 0.0182 0.0375 0.1556* 0.0862 0.1127* 0.0914 0.0019 0.1091* 0.0201 -0.0132 -0.0288 0.0038 -0.0001 0.0863 -0.0323 -0.0243 0.0105 -0.0039 -0.0773
36 Relative employment size -0.1301* -0.0979 -0.0803 -0.032 -0.0509 -0.0242 0.0129 -0.0926 -0.1390* -0.1207* 0.0617 0.0328 0.0593 -0.1429* 0.2171* 0.1527* 0.2281* 0.1442* 0.0356
37 Competing bidders 0.1217* 0.0248 -0.0268 -0.0045 0.0071 -0.0431 0.0467 0.0918 -0.1059* -0.057 0.0572 0.0306 0.0606 -0.1155* -0.0378 -0.0353 -0.0033 0.0366 -0.0203
38 Divestment 0.0761 0.0504 -0.0527 -0.0298 -0.0979 -0.0938 0.3031* 0.3822* -0.3244* -0.3296* 0.1384* 0.1560* -0.0208 -0.1327* -0.0379 -0.1708* -0.0295 -0.1698* -0.2219*
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
20 Efficiency motive 1
21 Vertical integration motive -0.2541* 1
22 Diversification motive -0.2102* -0.1602* 1
23 Target size 0.2562* -0.0869 0.0148 1
24 Target OCF/TA -0.0621 -0.064 0.0237 0.0312 1
25 Target ROA 0.0262 0.0465 -0.0468 0.1791* 0.1008 1
26 Target labour productivity 0.0563 0.0143 -0.1016* 0.1550* 0.0947 0.0376 1
27 Target leverage 0.0366 0.0037 -0.0352 0.011 0.097 -0.0599 0.1161* 1
28 Target run-up -0.0573 -0.0027 0.0127 -0.1401* 0.1118* 0.0401 0.0511 -0.0873 1
29 Acquirer size 0.1652* 0.0064 0.0294 0.6656* 0.0858 0.1228* 0.1056* 0.0642 0.0182 1
30 Acquirer OCF/TA 0.0149 0.0686 -0.0266 0.0527 0.1289* -0.0383 0.0219 -0.0041 0.0143 0.1177* 1
31 Acquirer ROA -0.0462 -0.0533 0.0545 0.1335* 0.1733* 0.1100* -0.1045* 0.0733 0.035 0.2544* 0.0606 1
32 Acquirer labour productivity 0.0466 -0.0373 -0.0137 -0.0176 0.0046 0.0241 0.0836 0.0371 -0.0651 -0.0578 -0.0465 -0.074 1
33 Acquirer leverage 0.0946 -0.0449 0.012 0.1615* 0.0317 -0.0642 0.0131 0.1507* -0.08 0.1870* -0.0259 0.0059 -0.045 1
34 Hostile 0.1003 0.0025 -0.0182 0.1896* -0.0684 0.011 -0.0069 0.0432 0.0648 0.1019* 0.0482 -0.0467 -0.0284 0.1145* 1
35 All-cash payment 0.02 0.0079 0.0839 -0.063 0.0303 -0.0087 0.0431 -0.0117 0.0058 0.2079* -0.0313 -0.0161 0.0461 -0.0112 -0.0047 1
36 Relative employment size 0.0202 -0.1054* 0.0384 0.0582 -0.0461 -0.0492 -0.1364* 0.0726 -0.1418* -0.5089* -0.1386* -0.1302* 0.2440* -0.1402* 0.0745 -0.3206* 1
37 Competing bidders 0.022 -0.0308 0.0372 0.0608 0.0122 -0.0227 -0.0568 -0.0677 0.1472* 0.0684 0.0044 -0.0246 -0.0675 -0.058 0.2565* 0.0062 -0.0093 1
38 Divestment 0.1900* 0.0545 0.0261 0.2481* -0.0429 -0.0063 -0.0127 0.0208 -0.0296 0.1886* -0.0066 -0.0438 -0.0803 0.0808 0.2075* 0.0596 0.0101 0.0947 1
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